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INTRODUCTION
In order for a Christian social system to fulfill its
postulated social and also economic values, it would have of
necessity, from the standpoint of established doctrine, to comply
with what constitutes its more fundamental ontological and
axiological premises. These latter principles would demarcate the
permissible limits of topological variations in socio-economic
institutional and organizational modes. In effect, these social
conformations ultimately project, especially in their polar or
extreme cases, the nature of the conception of man and of his
social life which underlie their formation. Now, it is on these
grounds that Christian social teaching rejects Marxist socialism
and unmitigated capitalism. They not only embody unacceptable
views of man and of his social nature, but precisely on account of
this, make use .of organizational and functional. expedients which
inevitably frustrate the attainment of the more immediate Christian
social values and objectives. That is, these systems are both
philosophically objectionable in principle, as well as inexpedient
in terms of desired social values and results. In this respect, it
should be observed that even the prophetic sense of justice and its
manifestation in the old testament was inextricably bound with the
operation of market transactions. The Judeo-Christian tradition
and ethos operates in a universe of individual rights and duties.
Its teachings and spirit would be totally alien to the arbitrary
and capricious workings of the apatheosized theocratic rulers of
antiquity, the absolute monarchs of modernity or the
supernationalist contemporary state.
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It is no accident that the inception of an integrated view of
the moral requirements and conditions of an economic system had to
await the coetaneous development of the medieval scholastic school
and of a resurgent market economy in Europe. Two other points
should be noted. The first is the inherent dynamic quality of
Christian social teachings based, as they are, on a melioristic
perception of human society and a progressive unfolding of the
Natural Law. Largely because of this, the doctrine has
historically remained highly flexible and indeterminate regarding
the range of acceptable socio-economic institutions, organizational
modes and corresponding behavior patterns. The second observation
is complementary to the first. It deals with what has been called
the sUbjective rationalism of scholasticism. The gist of it
consists in the fact that although Christian moral philosophy from
the schoolmen onwards was willing to accept market relations as the
basic framework of economic operations, it nevertheless was never
willing in principle to unconditionally accept as final the
outcomes of the blind forces of the market. That is, Christian
social doctrine steadfastly refused to automatically sanction the
unmediated or unmodified results stemming from the interaction of
whatever market forces happened to exist in concrete situations.
Furthermore, it also rejected, both on ontological and on socio-
economic grounds, even the pure and unmixed doctrine of
unadulterated competitive capitalism. Once more, it has always
been evident in the unity and internal cohesion shown by Christian
social doctrine that its formulators unequivocally realized the
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interdependent nature of instrumental socia-economic values with
those others which collectively could be referred to as meta-
sociologic~l in character. In fact, over the truly long-run the
latter plays the role of independent variables in the social
system, sUbstantially contributing to the particular character of
the former. All comprehensive and influencing social doctrines
have always been aware of the predominant role played by our
conceptualizations of human nature and their decisive implications
in the molding of society's constitution and behavior.
Christian social doctrine has become increasingly specific and
detailed in its socio-economic analysis, institutional criticism
and policy evaluation and recommendations since the formulation of
Rerum Novarum in 1890. So much so, that it can be said that the
lineaments of a generic family of systems has been gradually
emerging over the close-to-a-century period elapsed since then.
Incidentally, the writings and declarations of Protestant scholars
and reformed churches can be said to closely parallel the Catholic
position in these matters, just like it was also the case at the
time of the Reformation.
One cannot help but wonder what is the origin and root cause
of the discernible narrowing in the range of global socio-economic
arrangements and institutions acceptable to the aspirations of
contemporary man. In turn, in a fundamental sense, these
aspirations are eminently compatible with and in fact ultimately
derived from the substratum of Judeo-Christian values on man and
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society which lie at the base of Western civilization. The answer
to the palpable globalization and increasing homogeneity of
economic wants and, to a lesser extent, of concrete social forms,
seems to be due to the influence of the historical forces and
trends which have eventuated into the contemporary condition known
as modernization. No doubt, the irreducible Judeo-Christian
conception of man on which the social phenomenon of modernization
rests, has by now become irretrievably universal through the
diffusion and influence of Western civilization.
Modernization poses a great challenge to modern man. It can
operate as a radically redemptive force which will elevate and
ennoble man or it can prove to be his final undoing. The
Promethean forces released by the modern world threaten to engulf
man and to frustrate the very purpose of the human quest.
Paradoxically, the very same freedom made possible by the
historical advance of values such as dignity, equality, freedom,
and individualism, coupled with scientific and technical progress,
allowing man to shape his life and to choose his options more amply
than at any other time in the past, may also have set the stage for
his spiritual degradation if not his physical demise and total
extinction. If man debases himself or if he does away with his
life, it will be done in freedom. No one but himself will be
responsible. No one but himself can decide.
vA METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
In this essay I have attempted to weave in a very general and
preliminary fashion a number of strands which would seem to be the
most relevant and noteworthy in the complex and multi-faceted
fabric of contemporary Christian social teaching. Many other
building blocks which are part of the prismatic structure of the
political economy of Christianity were unfortunately left out.
Space limitations made the decision to truncate the exposition a
painful but an inevitable one.
Other combinations of topics and specific sUbjects would have
been possible in lieu of the present one. It could have been held
with considerable merit that this paper should have been more
consistently empirical or, at the other extreme, totally devoted to
a theoretical treatment of the theme at hand. I believe those
other approaches would also have been valid and useful options. In
the end, what appears to me as an eclectic solution, albeit one
that emphasizes the historico-theoretical over the purely factual
or concrete, seemed to be the most appropriate alternative under
the circumstances.
One shortcoming of which I am acutely aware is the failure to
explicitly discuss the social doctrine and pronouncements of
Christian churches other than the Catholic. My rationale for that
is that there has been since the inception of Christianity a common
corpus of social central doctrines and traditions in the Christian
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churches which are homogeneous and fairly recognizable. This body
of teachings has, of course, undergone transformation and change
over time, but it has nonetheless retained a substantive continuity
and identity of its own. Not even after the Reformation was any
fundamental fragmentation of its essential unity along
denominational lines to be observed. As contemporary events and
tendencies have sharpened our focus on economic issues, forcing
positions on a number of socio-economic questions to a head, the
exactitude and definitude of mainstream Christian political economy
has correspondingly increased. The crystallization of those
doctrines have found apt expression in recent social encyclicals
and the documents of Vatican II. It is my contention that to all
practical purposes, and for an exercise of limited dimensions like
the present one certainly is, these sources will prove to be
SUfficiently representative as not to introduce any major
distortions in this presentation.
I hope to have to some extent succeeded in highlighting, no
matter how generally and imprecisely, the theological philosophical
and socio-economic fundamentals for present day Christian political
economy. Historical developments that have conditioned the'milieu
in which Christian moral philosophy is to operate have been dealt
with in a stylized fashion, that is, in terms of abstractions of
intellectual and social history such as secularization and
modernization. No effort has been made to document these
happenings by means of a more traditional historical approach.
vii
In closing, I would also like to observe that the paper's
intent goes beyond the strictly descriptive and taxonomic. Even if
in a weak and rUdimentary manner, it shows systemic ambitions. It
conceives of Christian political economy as a coherent, integrated
and functional whole, possessed of its own inherent logic and
exhibiting dynamic qualities which' are hatched by the unfolding of
historical trends and processes. However, there is nothing in this
which smacks' of perfectibility. There are no deterministic or
necessitarian implications in terms of human consciousness or
conduct. History may incubate certain forces and build a worldly
stage of its own. still and all, the choice is man's.
I. SECULARIZATION: A NATURAL THEOLOGY OF MAN
I. God created man formally (a) intelligent, (b) morally
free and (c) therefore, responsible before Him. As a result, all
men are ontogically equal before His eyes regarding their formal
attributes and their corresponding accountability to Him. Social
freedom is necessary for man to exercise his responsibility.
II. All men are possessed of equal ontological dignity
because all have been endowed with a spiritual soul and created in
His image and likeness. Man is the Son of God. His dignity also
requires him to be free.
III. Men are to conduct themselves in a solidary fashion
because they are all brothers under a common Divine Father. These
are fundamental principles of Christianity, with direct
implications on the social order and the dynamics of history.
The above axioms constitute a theology of man with
transcendental social consequences. In effect, if man is intelli-
gent, free in the volitional or volitive sense that he can choose
in the light of reason, and, therefore, responsible, then he is
naturally endowed with the traits necessary to exercise his
personal freedom in the social realm. That is, SUbjected to the
needs of the common good, he is free to act in society as an
individual. Now, his inherent dignity, which has been always
recognized in the Western tradition as something which requires
that his individual freedom be respected, just like God respects it
in the super-natural realm of morality. Furthermore, in order for
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his inherent dignity not to be transgressed or infringed upon, his
natural rights as a spiritual being created in God's image must be
fully respected. In this scheme of things, man's freedom is a
fundamental and sine qua non condition for the exercise of his
reason and volition. without freedom his humanity is not fully
actualized because he cannot exercise his reason and will.
So man must be free because he is capable of being so, and
because the actualization of his humanity and respect for his
dignity also demand it. Now, in the social realm, recognition of
man's freedom (again, based on his capacity to be free and on his
inherent dignity) gradually leads to an expansion of the realm of
equality. Man's freedom can only be legitimately curtailed by the
dispositions of Natural Law in general and those affecting the
common good in particular. As theories of the common good have
gradually discarded or rejected objective social and political
rationalism, the area of individual freedom in society has
increased • Universal enfranchisement and the disappearance of
theologically sanctioned differences in social status have been
accomplished. Even objective economic rationalism has been
modified to include the universal satisfaction of basic human needs
as a prerequisite for the exercise of social freedom in general and
even for the practice of economic freedom (in the sense of equality
of opportunity and participation in the economy) in particular.
Without freedom of action in society man could not have
attained legal, political, social, and economic equality (in the
sense of equality of opportunity) to the extent that he has
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succeeded in doing so in the Western world. Freedom has been the
efficient or proximate cause of equality. Sole recognition of
ontological equality and dignity, without freedom of social action,
would not have produced legal, political, social, and economic
equality.
Nonetheless, ontological equality has been the material cause
or epigenesis, responsible for the ultimate occurrence of legal,
political, social, and economic equality. without the recognition
of the legitimacy of the former, the latter varieties of societal
equalities could not have crystallized. In sum, freedom of social
action has been the efficient cause of the various social
equalities because it afforded the opportunity for human thought
and action to test, challenge and change the inegalitarian legal,
political, social,.and economic arrangement of society. As these
proved to be neither rationally impregnable nor necessary for
society's organization and function, they were brought down by
freely acting individuals which found them deleterious or limiting
to their well-being. In turn, freedom of social action would not
have been tolerated unless the implicit premise of ontological
equality had not been admitted. Recognition of ontological
equality signified that human social freedom could only be limited
by the dictates of Natural Law and the requirements of the common
good. Neither, of course, were opposed to those various forms of
equality.
Now, individualized freedom and equality in society need not
lead to the type of contemporary individualistic society with which
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we are familiar. That is, they need not eventuate into a modern
secularized society. The ultimate causes of secularization lie
somewhere else.
Aside from the host of contributing forces and associated
conditions which have mutually reinforced one another in a complex
circular causation-type-of-process over the centuries, there is one
fundamental and autonomous variable which is the cornerstone upon
which the subsequent historical process of secularization rests.
The underlying factor tying the whole evolutive process together is
an active concern for, and a high valuation of, the material world
and of human life and action within it.
Western man' s purposiveness towards the world has been
extremely marked. Man's inherent purposiveness has reached the
acme of its transformative manifestation in the Western effort to
dominate the material world through scientific and technological
development. with freedom as an efficient cause, and ontological
equality as a material one, individualism in the societal realm was
bound to advance very rapidly as it, in effect, did.
The concurrence of a number of other factors increasingly
oriented Western societal individualism towards economic production
in general and the commercial world in particular. The confluence
of an exponential curve for the growth of scientific and
technological knowledge; cultural and economic interaction through
the European land mass; and a number of associated instrumental
elements like population growth; the proliferation of towns; the
emergence of dense transportation and communication networks; the
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mUltiplication of fairs and markets; the invention and diffusion of
financial institutions and instruments, were all greatly important
in shaping the contours of the Western world.
These natural or vegetative processes were sUbstantially
accelerated by the separation of Church and Empire, the surging of
the new European nation states, their interminable wars, and the
crucial role played by economic development in sustaining the
policies of the absolute monarchs. The impulse given to the
expansion of the middle classes, and their growing relative
importance in society in consideration to the role they played in
manning the economic development process, was certainly a no less
important factor. The history of the bourgeoisie is essential to
the understanding of the modus operandi of the constellation of
forces which have produced the secularization of the world.
Although the bourgeoisie would have certainly prospered on its
own, quite aside from its quasi-political role during the
mercantilistic period and the era of absolute monarchs, it is
equally true that these historical developments were of enormous
importance in magnifying .the impact of this class and the speed
with which it disseminated its ideas through the social body. The
clear inclination in Western Civilization not to restrain the
individual's freedom of social action beyond what the paradigms of
the age define as necessary for the common good, had already opened
the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie since very early after the
constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. The previously mentioned
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negative and political fa~tors served to give further impulse to
this development.
Concurrently, the materialization of the world (greater
relative abundance of material goods) and its commercialization by
the bourgeoisie would of themselves tend to, and in effect actually
did, facilitate the secularization process, although there was no
inherent necessity for that outcome to have taken place. That is,
the disappearance of the economic restrictions represented by the
Church's moral framework and their formal support by the state,
accelerating after the Reformation, certainly contributed to the
exacerbation of an acquisitive or purely economistic behavior on
the part of the economic agents.
How much of a constraining factor the Church-State entente
would have been had it lasted, no one really knows. In any case,
mercantilism and national wars worked in the opposite direction.
They multiplied the opportunities for profit and further freed the
conditions under which they could be made. Later on, as the class
compact and social solidarity inherited from old gradually broke
down in the nation states under the influence of economistic
behavior, secularization kept on making successive inroads into the
life of society. That is, the bounded perimeter for legitimate
economic behavior to take place, i.e., the social framework which
was to serve as referent for economic values, was repeatedly
shattered. Ultimately, only the individual facing himself was left
standing.
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Conceivably, man could have avoided this result. At a purely
speculative level of discourse, it is imaginable that he could have
held to a set of abstract, non-economicsupraindividual values,
even if the available opportunities--negative developments; the
Church-State conflict; progressive materialization of the world--
would have strongly inclined him to an unbridled economistic
behavior. Just like at an earlier time, neither the Church nor the
Empire restrained themselves sUfficiently to avoid their rupture,
and again much like how Roman and Protestant clergy were to
precipitate their separation, so modern man was to ineluctably
advance on the road to secularization and undeterred individualism.
Fundamentally, the above train of historical events rests on
the high regard of Western man for the material world and his quest
to better his own condition in it whenever possible. It is true
that the notion of progress did not become generalized until
perhaps the Seventeenth Century, but an increasing number of people
had opted to abandon the land and traditional life since much
earlier. This in contrast to other civilizations where
overpopulation had dire consequences without large numbers of
people deciding to break away from customary life patterns.
Indeed, there is an activism, a dynamic character and
aggressiveness, which is peculiar to Western civilization. The
desire to achieve and to indulge in social deviance have shown a
much higher statistical incidence in it than in other large
civilizations. A critical mass for that kind of behavior obtained
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about the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Century in Europe. A conjunction
of objective or accumulative factors (technological advance,
agricultural revolution, population growth, intra-structural
facilities) and sUbjectively generated elements (increase in
commerce, banking, finance, drive to establish towns) had been
slowly reinforcing and interacting with one another for a long
time. Now, a momentum was reached which made for the acceleration
of the growth process.
Interestingly, outwardly similar social and material processes
in the Arab World and China, as well as in a host of ancient
civilizations and cultures, never yielded results comparable to
those reached in the West. Perhaps the great European SYmbiosis
represented by the multisecular and complex interaction of a number
of disparate cultures and experiences which took place from the
Graeco-Roman period on, had unique and non-repeatable
characteristics.
During the period of the Pax Christiana Europe became a
relatively CUlturally homogeneous area, SUbsisting in a
geographically compact but still resource-wise diversified area.
These factors, in conjunction with the above mentioned socio-
psychological elements, created a distinct and singular historical
reality.
Even destructive wars and internecine conflict in Europe did
not derail the material progress of the area. Economic development
itself became a tool of the religious and succession wars that the
continent experienced for centuries. However, the momentum of the
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European culture and ethos were such that despite great material
losses and the decimation of the population, scientific creativity,
technological advance, intellectual speculation, artistic work and
sustained effort at material production went on. Individually led
effort in all areas of life did not wane, but rather proliferated
with the passage of time despite apparently adverse objective
social conditions.
It would seem that the frequency and willingness on the part
of large numbers in the population to evince a dynamic attitude and
to engage in non-traditional and innovative behavior, is
characteristic of European civilization and differentiates it from
other large cultural systems. In this sense, business and the
businessman are of one essence in accounting for the development of
Western civilization. Economic and mercantile activity have been
preferential channels for personal expression, domination,
creativity and upward social mobility. These profound subterranean
currents and culturally shaped trends were deeply enmeshed in the
very fabric of the culture. They were part and parcel of what we
understand by Western culture and are inseparable from it. Their
social manifestation would not have been precluded even if the
Reformation had not given occasion for the formulation of a
Calvinistic ethic. The actual flow of the historical river would
have been perhaps somewhat different and its meanderings would have
followed other patterns but, essentially, the end results would
have been the same. That is, even if Church and empire had not
sundered, even if the moral restrictions on economic activity would
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not have been removed, sooner or later Western Civilization would
have confronted the problems stemming from secularization and
modernization. After all, the latter inevitably follows from the
former. Ultimately, the great challenge of Western Civilization is
the harnessing of man's genius, of Prometheus' fire, to the service
of spiritual values. There are enormously powerful inherent
tendencies in it working against a harmonious synthesis of spirit
and matter. Perhaps only a supremely free act of man's will can
accomplish this. Finally, his freedom will decide his fate as it
has decided his life.
Western man cannot transfer personal responsibility for his
acts to anyone else. There are no masters, exploiters, or
deceivers from outside to be blamed. He has created his reality.
He has the power to define himself, his life, and his world. He
can live with God or without Him. The choice is his.
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II. SECULARIZATION AND ECONOMISM
Let us now explore other associated facets of the seculari-
zation process which relate to the vastly expanded role and
importance of the economic function in society since the late
Middle Ages. First, there is a quasi-mechanical process which
dictates that the advance of secularization will automatically
bring about a greater valuation of the economic function and
corresponding devaluation of other superordinated social sub-
systems. We are not simply referring to the tautological fact that
the definition of the term secularization itself denotes a
separation or autonomical development of the economic realm, which
gradually comes to free itself from any superordinate system of
values, be it supernal or not. Obviously, in the course of that
process, economic values change their subordinate position and,
thus, of necessity are elevated in rank, both absolutely, and also
in relative terms to other formerly superordinated value systems.
Rather, the aspect which is being focused upon here is the
experiential one. In brief, this signifies that as secularization
advances and economic functions gain in independence, they will
inevitably tend to become ends in themselves, conditioning other
less immediate, tangible and time consuming values and realities.
These will grow increasingly remote, and although paid lip service,
will inevitably become less functional and visible in everyday
life. In extreme cases, such values may turn into mere symbols and
stereotypes, having been enshrined in conventional and function-
less language and ritual which are totally segregated from real
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life, that is, an independent economic realm will tend to put other
subordinate realms out of existence, rendering them ineffective
and, finally, superfluous.
There is another facet of historical evolution which enhances
the role of economic life. That is the quest for equality in the
various realms of man's life. Economics is the last frontier of
equality excepting the right to the privacy of one's person and
company. Other forms of equality, regardless of transcendental
ulterior effects on man and society, do not have of themselves such
a large immediate impact on social institutions and the conduct of
daily life. Religious, legal, political, and formal social
equality--i.e., absence of legally condoned distinctions in social
status--do not impinge on daily life with the disruptive force that
changes in economic institutions and organizations do. It is in
this respect that the advance of economic freedom in the history of
the West has been the instrument of radical and profound
modifications in society. Clearly, there is no need to elaborate
on this point. Moreover, the issues and consequent battles
connected with the protean interpretations of terms such as
equality of economic opportunity or equality proper, have now come
to occupy the central stage in the affairs of contemporary
societies and the world at large.
Let us examine this question further. Why the importance of
economics for social equality, the implementation of human freedom,
and even the expression of ontological dignity?
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The general answer to that question is that a certain minimal
amount of absolute economic welfare (in terms of man's basic
needs), of relative well-being (in terms of one own's society and,
of the world's level of technological and economic development),
and of respect for the individual's personal right to equality of
economic opportunity (with a minimum assured base sUbject to
cultural variability and historical epoch--i.e., limited
egalitarianism), is totally necessary if human beings are to
manifest and express their ontological freedom, equality and
dignity in the contemporary world.
Today's world is not only highly material (in the technical
sense of roundaboutness in production and of a large volume of
consumption per unit of need or want satisfaction), but also one in
which man's instrumental intelligence and social structures are
ever more at the service of economic ends and commercial
activities. Furthermore, it is a world in which economic life in
developed countries is no longer connected with subsistence
activities. Furthermore, it is a world in which economic life in
developed countries is no longer connected with subsistence
activities, or with providing the paraphernalia for non-economi-
cally acquired social status, or even as it turns out to be the
case in affluent western societies, with validating the worth and
social status of the individual through economic success. Economic
activity is increasingly becoming in highly advanced societies the
final cause of social life itself. It is the ultimate object or
goal of man's strivings, due to the fact that its working directly
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translates into hedonic or, more generically, egoistic pleasure.
Thus the economy has turned into a narcotic. It induces the torpor
of satiety and the dullness of surfeit. consumption becomes its
own end. Pleasure reflects upon itself. It becomes the only
reality, not a means to something else. Even highly sophisticated
and apparently uplifting activities, like those related to art and
culture, may be undertaken for purely egocentric and self-serving
reasons.
In the classical liberal tradition the economy is a proximate
means which provides the wherewithal for carrying out the
activities and actions that have been consciously and independently
chosen by the individual. These, then, are the true ends of
freemen in social life. Consequently, the spheres of means and
ends remain totally separate and distinct. The self-awareness of
the individual is not influenced by economic processes. By
contrast, the attitudes and behavior characterizing economism,
which are those associated with the socio-structural condition
called modernization (the former term refers to the psychic or
subjective requirements of modernization: motivations, attitudes,
incentives, and behavior; the latter deals with the corresponding
social institutions, their structure and functioning), are derived
from a milieu in which the economy suffuses and permeates man's
conception of life, orientation and personal conduct in a
cumulative, circular and self-reinforcing fashion. However, it is
not a question as the Marxists would have it, of consciousness
being determined by economic conditions. Rather, it is an
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acceptance, a voluntary giving in by man to a practical life
conception founded on psychological and moral utilitarianism where
the economy is the ultimate end, the purpose, object, and rationale
of social life. The economy then becomes the final cause of man's
life in society.
Secularization and the Future of society
As pointed out before, the delay of the Second Coming and of
expectations regarding its imminence constitute the substratum and
remote antecedent operating in the creation of a secularized
environment, one in which the problems of this world kept on
acquiring increasing importance and demanding impatient attention.
That is, as one had to concern oneself with the organization of
this world and had to settle down for permanent habitation of the
planet, material values inevitably had to gain in importance.
This, of itself, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the material world had to become autonomous, disassociating itself
from the spiritual world. The superordinate function of the latter
over the former could have conceivably continued, say, if Church
and Empire had not parted their ways. But, no doubt, such a
linkage became progressively more improbable as, (a) historical
time continued to elapse, and, (b) as natural and normal (in the
sense of fully expectable and in agreement with human nature)
ambitious (personal and social) needs kept on asserting their
primacy over more ethereal and less immediate and pressing
spiritual claims and strictures. Another reason which is often
invoked to explain the occurrence of historical secularization is
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not. as convincing as (a) and (b): namely, scientific and
technological progress. In brief, there is again no necessary
reason why in principle one cannot adopt the classical Western
solution to the problem of theism in an increasingly scientific
culture. That is, to think of God more along deistic than strictly
providential lines. God could always be the prime causa, the prime
mover, the Creator, but not the actual ruler of the world.
In any case, there has been a progressive long term tendency
towards secularization of the world evermore noticeable since the
religious Reformation. As we know, what this means in practical
terms is that uncontrolled or autonomous material values are able
to gradually assert themselves in the world. Theoretically, one
could maintain that sensu stricto, such a development is possible
without a weakening of those meta-material (religious, moral and
ethical) values of the individual whose inspiration and essence do
not rest on the foundation of enlightened or reasonable egoism. In
reality, to accept such a possibility as viable one would have to
imagine a world in which the impact or influence of material (or
for that matter, non-material)· values on the psyche and
consciousness of the individual would be totally neutral. In other
words, one would have to believe that those values have no overall
shaping or molding influence on the individual's sense of self-
identity, his beliefs, motivations, attitudes and behavior. To
imagine that material values will not predominate, even if not
appropriately reined in either by institutions or a very strong and
well defined consciousness to the contrary, is totally naive and
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unreal. Conceiving of material values as being merely instrumental
in a world where they hold sway and reign unchallenged, at least in
the realm of everyday praxis, is very hard to accept as a
reasonable conclusion. That is, material values have, like non-
material ones, their own ideational and noetic influence over the
human mind. If they constitute a strong reality they will have a
correspondingly strong effect over the human psyche.
A second, more often cited reason to explain the shaping
influence of values on the mind relies, as we have discussed, on
the importance of value-conformed institutions in creating our own
conception of the nature of reality. In effect, institutions
organized and structured in accordance with certain sets of values
impact us from the outside as separate entities. They influence
and act upon us as reified and crystallized realities whose
presence color and condition our world and, at the very least,
restrict and delimit our choices, alternatives and possible
behavioral paths.
In the intellectual history of the Christian West one can
differentiate four sets of values and institutional experiences
that will illustrate this. These sets do not neatly correspond
with an historical chronology, and do not represent either an
attempt at periodization or the construction of a stage-type theory
of history (Stufenlehre), nor do they posit a theory of evolution
or development based on this or that recognizable historical force
or trend. These four experiences can be categorized as follows:
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(1) spirituai values--spiritually oriented institutions; (2)
spiritual values--materially oriented institutions; (3) material
values--spiritually oriented institutions; (4) material values--
materially oriented institutions.
Set number one would ideationally correspond to the first
centuries of Christianity and efforts of the Fathers of the Church
to shape the material world in accordance with the intentions and
precepts of the Scriptures. Set number two roughly coincides with
scholasticism from Thomas Aquinas on and extending from about the
Thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. Set number three is clearly
associated with the Reformation and the socio-economic outlook of
Protestantism, as explained by Max Weber, and is most particularly
relevant to the views and doctrines of Calvin. The fourth set is
identified with the social ideologies and practices of our own
times in advanced western countries, above them all, the united
states.
Notice that in the context of set one, religious values would
dictate the conformation of social institutions which would then
directly respond to the ethos of those values. Ideally,
institutions would be perfectly in accordance with the values in
question or minimally deviate from their ethos. In set two,
institutions have already deviated considerably from the ideal of
the religious values supposedly informing their formation. still,
those values restrict the acceptable range of variation for
institutions and behavior in society. The latter are constrained
in their constitution and functioning by the religious ethos. Set
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three inverts the relationship obtained in two. Materially oriented
institutions, although pursuing their own logic and particular
ends, must still be rationalized in the light of ultimate religious
goals and teleological schemes in agreement with divine
dispensation. In the last set the institutions and behavior of
society are totally unconstrained by meta-material considerations
in their organization, structuring and behavior. Any attempt at
reconciling social institutions and a transcendental ethos and
values is purely nominal in nature. Verbal injunctions, counsels
of perfection and, generally, moral laudatory and hortatory
statements are non-operational in terms of established realities
and behavior.
Fully developed Capitalism and orthodox Marxist socialism are
very much compatible with the last mentioned combination of values
and behavior. Material values and behavior and an individualistic
outlook on life and society are ideal companions. They complement
one another very well. In. a fundamental sense, archetypal
capitalism embodies the essence and very logic of optimal
individual utility maximization. It is a codified institutional
behavioral system directed at the most intelligent attainment of
that end. Marxist socialism in its actual praxis and in the
system's theoretical conception is no different in its end of
maximal individual satisfaction and material development.
Basic Western socio-political egalitarianism, which quite
effortlessly, is conceptually extensible to the economic field, is
itself a mixture of Benthamite utilitarianism in the realm of
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theoretical social policy, and of the impatience of popular
reaction to the lowness and ineffectiveness of the trickle down
process in laissez-faire capitalism. This makes the historical
appearance of such ideas perfectly logical. Pure capitalism and
Marxism both pertain to the same genus. Their logical and
historical filiation are quite similar. Soviet Marxism or
Communism of course, is a modified version of Asiatic despotism
and, as such, much closer experimentally to the Maoist socialist
experiments in China and Southeast Asia than to its Western
European counterparts. On the other hand, Euro-communism or
socialism with a human face would theoretically constitute not so
much a quantitatively different, but rather a qualitatively
divergent, reality from that of soviet communism. It would
ultimately require motivations different from those of capitalism
or those others exhibited in the past by soviet Marxism for its
successful operation. One would do well to be highly skeptical of
the viability of Euro-Communism. Ultimately, just as in a limit
situation, the core economic differences between capitalism and
socialism would mainly be of a psychological nature, so the
differences between Humanist and soviet socialism do likewise
reside, at least strictly in principle, in their profound
psychological divergences embracing the central concepts of
philosophical and historical determination and of human nature
itself and its functio~al relation to society.
Let us now proceed to add a related comment on the breakdown
of community. The value roots, instrumental motives, attitudes and·
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behavior of Anglo-Saxon (Western in contrast to Occidental) culture
are ultimately incompatible with the preservation of community. By
contrast in the case of Iberian and its descendant, pre-
capitalistic Hispanic-American culture, the conflict was not nearly
that acute. However, the family of the latter sub-cultures is
rapidly disappearing under the dual onslaught of capitalism and
Marxist socialist ideas. Even to the extent that those paradigms
would formally persist in an institutional or organizational sense,
it seems highly unlikely that profound value-based dissimilarities
with Anglo-Saxon culture will continue to survive. Reinvigoration
of institutionally and behaviorally operational chains of
compatible values, motivations, attitudes and behavior that would
translate into appropriate social action and institutions, are
necessary if this likely outcome is to be reversed. In the end,
that would prove to be the only possible manner in which the
identity of those sub-cultures could be preserved. In other words,
cultural differences would tend to disappear not as a result of a
predetermined outcome brought about or imposed by historical forces
and processes responding to mechanisms impelled by economic
determinism, but rather as an outcome of the more or less ~reely
adopted cultural, institutional and behavioral patterns typical of
modernization processes. In the distant future, surviving cultural
/
differences will be of a superficial nature. Customs, habits and
social forms. may vary from one society to the other but the
essential orientation of the individual to his society and to his
fellow man will be, for the most part, highly similar everywhere,
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with the possible but not too probable exception of a few
fundamentalist and nativistic societies.
Consumerism, explicitly and unabashedly self-centered
behavior, an exaltation of material values as proper ends of man's
activities and as operational definiens of his life, will become
the universal norm. still and all, the sterile and deadening
officially imposed cultural uniformity brought about in the past by
soviet socialism in its various epiphanies and avatars is, however,
infinitely less desirable. Its theocratic nature and apotheosizing
of the state, its bureaucratism and utter contempt for the rights
of the individual,locate this family of systems in a far removed
universe from that of the two previously mentioned ones, even when
allowing for the soothing effects of affluence and" the ultimate
advance of consumerism. Any attempt at a common taxonomy would
result in a futile exercise. soviet socialism is the archetype of
Oriental despotism and represents a genus whose specific difference
consists in the suppression of the individual and the exaltation of
the political and military-economic might of the state.
Finally, an observation on the survival of the consciousness
of freedom among the few and the possibility of disseminating that
particular value among the majority of mankind. Economic
betterment will not bring by itself a yearning for individual
freedom and political righte. Less so will it guarantee men
rebelling against totalitarian states in the search for them. On
the other hand, without a minimum of economic welfare and the
benefits of a humanistic education one should not expect many
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people evincing a strong demand for those intangible goods. The
identification of the factors and conditions that will make
individual freedom and political rights intensely desirable to men
is not clear at all. In the final analysis, one thing has become
historically obvious: Humanistic values were not able to survive
in the stifling atmosphere of Soviet socialism. The cultural
elements embodying those kind of values will not be able to endure
under that kind of a rule. Again, only superficially different
cultural manifestations will be tolerated in such societies. The
pendulum of our age oscillates between the crude materialism and
meaningless freedom of consumerist societies and the horrendous and
nightmarish totalitarian repression of Eastern despotism. Is there
room available and time left for a humanistic or Christian-like
culture?
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III. NATURAL LAW, SCHOLASTICISM AND SOCIAL REFORM
It would be convenient at this point to recall that Natural
Law doctrine displays an ancient and uninterrupted lineage that is
coextensive with the development of Western thought and
civilization, having conditioned the innermost fibers of the latter
and the ideal structure and behavior of its institutions. The
encyclicals are, as a matter of fact, the most important example of
contemporary, undiluted documents along those lines of thought.
Their general standing, principles and rationale, gyg social
documents are a logical extension and timely elaboration of
traditional Christian moral philosophical doctrine. As such, their
spirit and sUbstantive approach are historically availed by the
practically unchallenged consensus of opinion and analysis in the
field of Christian moral philosophy until the advent of the modern
historical period. As a matter of fact, in many important
respects, it could be unequivocally stated that a consensus of
opinion has existed even after the Reformation and down to our own
days. This applies, of course, to "rationalist," Natural Law
thinkers and not to inspirationist ones. It is of interest to note
that in the areas we are concer~ed .with, namely, that of socio-
economic relations in the polity, the last two centuries have been
dominated by ideological systems of political economy originating
in derivations or perversions of medieval Natural Law sociology.
Such a situation should not be surprising if we were to pause
to realize that, no matter how much the premises on Which some
explanation of social phenomena may differ from say, those of
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Aristotle, no coherent and rational view of societal relations can
be entertained if denial of ratio recta to perceive and relate
human nature to its surrounding reality is denied.· After all,
barring the explainable but naive infatuation of the Enlightenment
and its latter-day offsprings in the second half of the Nineteenth
Century, no serious social scientist fails nowadays to acknowledge
the analytical efforts of the scholastic doctors in this direction.
Even their confusion sounds surprisingly modern, too. The
contributions of the schoolmen (often grouped and distinguished by
schools of thought) derived from systems built on observation both
of their immediate reality and on an essential view of human nature
in society gathered from a phenomenological perception of its
attributes and manifestations in everyday life.
Social science nowadays, in respect to its ultimate principles
and observations, is certainly no more sophisticated or
knowledgeable, although considerably less straightforward, candid,
or even structurally integrated, than scholastic science was at its
best. The social physics of positivism, a la Pareto, Edgeworth or
Comte, not only ended by being regarded as unscientific but,
ironically, proved to possess an infinitely more naive view of man
and his universe than the schoolmen ever had. Hayek long ago
warned with abundant reason and unsurpassed common sense against
the methodology of a wrongly understood "scientism" in the field of
the social sciences. Although there is supposedly no need in our
days to keep beating the dead horse of the contemporary
doctrinaires of social philosophy, the preceding remarks could be
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extended to the equally superficial but fanatical efforts to
covertly peddle warmed up cosmological views of man and society in
supposedly "neutral" and "scientific" assessments of reality.
On the other hand, there is at present a quite extended
escapist desire bent on ignoring the need for an explicit
recognition of fundamental conceptions of man and society. Candid
acceptance of widely held views in these matters is not only
essential to relevant views in the field of political economy, but,
furthermore, would not detract from that scientific spirit, which
in the minds of some, seems to be at odds with anything redolent of
reality. The problem, of course, does not reside in the
requirements of the scientific method, but in the lack of the
requisite boldness or frankness to admit what everybody knows,
namely, that the scientific method is not a fixed measuring rod or
nostrum mechanically applicable to diverse types of reality. That
the nature and requisites of observation and testing assume diverse
forms in accordance with the quality of the phenomena at hand.
Even if with the necessary reservations it were granted that
economic analysis proper is "purer" (more immediately testable)
than political economy, this would only be a matter of degree. In
any case, as indicated by Fellner and.Sorokin, if a body of axioms
or assumptions are explicitly·postulated and relational connections
between variables established in a segment of reality, such a body
of knowledga is a science.
Now, we must keep in mind that for the encyclicals economic
analysis is just a tool and that the Church documents aim at the
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propagation of the fundamentals for the creation of a family of
socio-economic orders whose justification or worth is rooted in an
ancient rational (Graeco-Roman) and religious (Christian) view of
man. Although such a view is peculiarly or specifically Western,
elements of it, especially those regarding religious teaching on
the ontological worthiness of man and on right conduct had already
made partial historical appearances in other civilizations. It
cannot be said, on the other hand, that previous to the Western,
Natural Law development, there had been any substantial
preoccupation with the socio-economic and political implications of
an essentially egalitarian view of the moral worthiness of man.
The Greeks, of course, had made their brilliant theorizing
efforts through the classical contributions of Plato and Aristotle
to political theory. Both, as we know, in conformity with the
universal-libertarian political spirit of today, not to speak of
their related views on the socio-economic preconditions of
political life. Even in the Middle Ages, before the mainstream of
Natural Law philosophy fragmented in diverse directions, the
libertarian spirit which is logically deduced from the doctrine of
free will and the inherent moral value of the human person, was
interpreted within, or constrained by, the rigidly stratified
society of the times. Social and economic prerequisites were
themselves relative toa previously defined rank order in society.
Nonetheless, Natural Law philosophers, vide the example of st.
Thomas, had always affirmed that knowledge or comprehension of the
dictates of Natural Law is a dynamic, perfectible process, taking
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place through time. Our insights gain clarity only progressively,
but in the light of right reason, hopefully in an unidirectional
and irreversible fashion.- The gradual appearance of contemporary
nearly classless societies, characterized by the vertical fluidity
of all social and income groups would, in no manner, have surprised
the scholars. Such political and social transformations as are
taking place today would not only have been deemed, correctly, as
incidental to the fundamental dictates of Natural Law as applied to
social life, but, furthermore, had such circumstances actually
arisen at their time, they would not have lacked sYmpathetic
understanding and historical antecedents, as well as theoretical
championing, in many reared in that tradition.
The scholastics came close, but never quite reached in their
vision the level of theoretical economic integration achieved by A.
Smith or F. Quesnay. Naturally, the use of Natural Law, both as an
intellectual substratum as well as an overarching and unifying
master concept, allowed them to develop a comprehensive and
congruent view of the social process. In that conception, the
economic world was not separate or autonomous or greatly important
in itself.
As scholasticism developed, especially from the Thirteenth
century onwards, their investigations into the social field coupled
with their Natural Law notions of a normal, just and beneficent
objective order of things, led them to increasingly accept concepts
structurally and functionally associated with the notion of the
market system. It was logical for the scholastic doctors to think
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of an objective order as also a natural one. Their gradually more
refined and analytically elaborate rendering of the competitive
price construct as a market embodiment of just price, is a prime
example of this tendency.
On the other hand, as their empirical knowledge of the social
world increased and as the workings of the market system expanded
and strengthened after the lower Middle Ages, Natural Law became
gradually more casuistic and interpretive. with the passage of
time, it became clear that, to a considerable extent, the actual
substantive implications of its secondary principles could only be
fully elucidated in the light of the concrete circumstances
informing particUlar cases or homogeneous categories of these.
with the explicit recognition of the importance that
partiCUlar conditions surrounding individual cases or sharply
defined genuses of these now had, it was obvious that the schoolmen
would not only come to contemplate interventions into, or
regulations of, social affairs as a perfectly legitimate expedient,
but, nay, as an indispensable policy instrument for the promotion
of the ultimate religions and moral ends which were truly important
to man and thus the object of their concerns.
However, one proviso need be added to this statement. The
schoolmen's fundamental mental framework called for order and
coherence. Their ideational universe would not have suffered a
sUbjective rationalism composed of ad hoc directives and dictates
without any systemic redeeming grace to it. SUbjective rationalism
had for them to be validated and justified not only in terms of a
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set of absolute and transcendental values, but also as adjustments
and iterations to some ideal social norm or earthly "City of God".
One other strand essential to an understanding. of scholastic
thought is derived from their hierarchical conceptualization of
man's ends, activities, and corresponding actions. In it, economic
life occupied a purely instrumental role. This, again, in a
twofold sense: the first, as social arrangements and material
mechanisms whose proper end is to directly satisfy man's needs for
economic goods and services. The second, as a realm where man's
essence as a person and his social traits are to be properly
manifested and developed. His eminent dignity, freedom,
sociability, and responsibility are to be exercised and reflected
in the conduct of his economic life. Therefore, the good economic
system has to be appropriately ordered to that end.
The sYmbiosis of these various concerns eventuates in a unique
mixture of objective and sUbjective rationalism. It rejects the
early classical view of laissez-faire, just like it spurns the
socialistic centrally planned economy. Both fail to satisfy the
requirements of social justice and the higher demands of a truly
human socio-economic order.
Although from a superficial and purely expediential viewpoint,
it would seem that the material requirements of the Common Good are
satisfiable under a modern liberal economic regime, this would be
highly deceptive. Even if a prosperous, full emplOYment economy
has been acceptable to many contemporary Christian authors on
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practical grounds, it would still fail to meet the most profound
conditions of a just and humane economy.
The ordering of the social economy must be such that man's
rule is not exclusively an instrumental one, subservient to the
goals of production, the. commercial economy or the state. His
direct individual action, and responsible participation, through
autonomous intermediate associations and variously composed
vocational groups, working with the state under the principle of
SUbsidiarity, but guided and oriented by an overall commitment to
social solidarity and cooperation for the realization of the Common
Good, are irrecusable and irreducible propositions of Christian
moral philosophy and social economics.
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IV. THE CHURCH(ES) IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
As noted above, attainment of minimal (absolute and relative)
economic conditions for mankind are necessary requisites for the
exercise of human social freedom, for the social expression of
ontological dignity, and also for the manifestation of the formal
attributes on which ontological equality is based.
Now, in a civilization and belief system where man's
domination of the world and the accumulation of scientific
knowledge, the perfecting of technical experience and continuously
increasing production of material goods, have become synonymous
with his God given worldly mission and raison d'etre, it is only to
be expected that economic activity would objectively gain in
importance. Within the geographic context dominated by Western
societies and culture this would further mean that the commercial
system and its specific . social relational forms have come to
prevail ever more forcefully. Nowadays, for the poor and deprived
minorities in developed countries and for the large masses of
I
L. D. C. s, economic activity is of enormous consequence. Not only in
the minimal, absolute sense in which human needs must be satisfied
for man to be able to lead a socially free and dignified life which
would be a reflection of his inner freedom and dignity, but also in
relative or comparative terms to others in their own societies and
also abroad. This does not mean that all of mankind must adopt the
same lifestyle or lead an homogenous life at the same level of
"development." What it points to is' that although productive
technologies and institutions, customs and habits of life, cultural
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character, weltanschauungen and ideologies may widely differ among
the peoples of the world, basic levels of knowledge, intellectual
development and command of relevant scientific paradigms must be
reasonably similar for ontological and social equality and dignity
to be an universal reality in the contemporary world.
The role of the Christian Church (es) is to attempt the
herculean task of reverting economic life and activity to an
instrumental role in developed societies and to orient and guide
the bast programs of political and socio-economic reform in
L.D.C.s. These would have for their purpose to make the economy
play its classical instrumental role as a handmaiden to man's
social freedom, of facilitating the embodiment of his ontological
dignity and equality in appropriate patterns of social life, and
last but not least, allowing the individual to exercise his own
private choices· in regards to social actions which involve a
positive economic cost.
It is quite different at the purely intellectual level to
conceive of how Christianity could succeed in transforming the
psychological components of the economistic position. Equally hard
is to conceive of how such a modification could be incorporated
into a redesigned socio-structural and functional system different
from that which today prevails in modernized society. No less
arduous is the task of imagining how L.D.C.s could attain not only
satisfactory rates of economic growth, but equally importantly, how
they could implement development programs tailored to their
specific social needs, cultural preferences and values. If one
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adds the shrinking of the time dimension in the contemporary world
to be previous obstacles, the picture is one of almost total
despair. Risinq expectations on the part of the new nations, sharp
ideological conflicts, economic scarcity, old institutions and
vested interests, all conspire against rational hope for a peaceful
and consensual solution.
Religions always emphasize subjective or inner personal over
institutional changes. The latter, if it is to come at all, is to
be a consequence of the long term action of the former on social
structures. Although Christianity is the most practical and action
oriented of all the major world religions, it has not been
different from others in regards to this matter. spiritual
transformation is the key to a better world.
Although Christianity, in principle, has always made the
individual accountable for the moral effect of his social actions,
it has been careful to delimit his responsibility within the ambit
of the social context in which the person operates. Christianity
has never, as a rule, demanded social heroism. The individual has
not been called upon to break existing institutional molds or to
judge his actions according to patterns and criteria different from
those prevailing in the society in which he finds himself inserted.
In other words, the individual Christian is not a soldier of
ideology committed to the implementation of an ideal vision of the
City of God on earth. It is not his duty to consciously activate
a philosophy of history for it to move along its preordained path •.
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Historically, he has never been required to live beyond the
stationary state.
However, conditions have changed in our time. In the past,
absence of moral progress was not a survival issue for mankind. At
present, the wide gap between man's scientific and technical
capabilities and his moral development poses a direct danger to the
future of the human race. Situations which in the past could be
callously but safely ignored, are turning into critical issues
demanding immediate attention. The moral imperative is now prodded
by proliferating intra-societal and international conflicts.
From the standpoint both of a purely idealistic and ideational
sense, that is, in a noetic or conceptual as well as in a hortatory
or moralizing sense, the Christian Church is today in a better
position to be relevant to the world than at any other moment since
the Renaissance. The social doctrine of Christianity is
progressivist and is based on the notion of the meliorism and
perfectibility of both man and society. Especially since the
Thirteenth century onwards, it has become clearly established that
the comprehension and application of secondary or derived Natural
Law principles in all matters, including social ones, is a dynamic
and unfolding historical process. Man's gradual increase in
knowledge, and the slow emergence of objectified economic
structures and mechanisms in the Western world from the early
Middle Ages onwards, in conjunction with the advance of social
freedom and equality, have greatly sharpened the Church (es)
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understanding of the requirements and characteristics of a just
social order.
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V. THE INCREASING SPECIFICITY AND OBJECTIFICATION
OF CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
The general injunctions and exhortations on social justice of
the prophets of the Old Testament, and of the early Church Fathers
in the Patristic literature, became progressively more precise and
articulate as a result of the doctrines developed by st. Thomas
Aquinas and the schoolmen under the rubric of Justitia et Jure.
A new level of specificity was reached in our own times with the
pUblication of the encyclical letter Rerum Novarum by Leo XIII at
the close of the last century (1891). From then on, each new
encyclical and social statement has been more specific than the
preceding one, discussing and evaluating social and economic
institutions, organizations and behavior in great detail and in a
very realistic fashion. Some of the watersheds in this process
have been Quadragesimo Anno by pius XI, Pacem in Terris, given by
John XXIII, Populorum Progressio during the reign of Paul VI and,
most recently, Laborem Excercens, written by John Paul II.
Clearly, both the Natural and Supernatural Theology of the Catholic
Church are indispensable in order to understand their social
message. Innumerable recent documents have provided the requisite
background and base on which the Catholic teaching on society
rests. Among the most important are: the Syllabus on Modern
Errors, given by pius IX in 1865; the encyclicals, Inscrutabili
Dei; Quod Apostolici Muneris; Cum Multa; Immortale Dei, Divine
Redemptoris; and special messages, like Nell'Alba and Con Sempre,
among very many others.
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By way of background, it would be convenient as well to
mention in passing some of the landmarks in the recent history of
the Catholic Church in Latin America. The two most important
meetings of the region's episcopate have been: The Second General
Conference of Medellin (1968) and the Third General Conference in
Puebla (1978). Prior to them, the First General Conference of the
Latin American Episcopate took place in Rio de Janeiro (1955).
Another important meeting was the Celam Conference in Mar del Plata
(1966) •
Medellin was primarily concerned with the Church trans-
formation in Latin America in accordance with the teachings of
Vatican II. It focused on the role of the Church in helping to
alleviate the plight of the poor. Puebla was to proceed along the
same road, although carrying further the exploration of the
concrete social~ economic and political conditions prevailing in
Latin America. Two documents from Paul VI proved of great value in
applying the general teachings of the church to the specific
circumstances of the.areas. The~e are, Octogessima Adveniens and
Evangelii Nuntiandi. They emphasize the importance of identifying
the cultural roots of the people and of building on them. It is
specifically acknowledged in the two that there may be many diverse
forms of Christian culture. These will vary in accordance with the
idiosyncracy of the various people and also the nature of the
times.
Puebla states that the La~in American culture is a derivative
of Western European culture. It is a result of the hybridization·
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of the Iberian and the indigenous cultures. It goes on to assert
that the Church is the most unifying factor in Latin America and
i ts culture. After affirming that the liberal ide.ology has
contributed to the diffusion of political liberty in the area, it
notes that elements of primitive capitalism are still highly
visible. The Church's position is that of wanting to help in the
construction of a new society. One in which there will not be any
marginal people and which will be based on equality and fraternity.
Also where everyone will have access to the essential goods: food,
clothing, housing, health, educational, recreational services, and
cultural activities. All of this to be attained without prejudice
to personal rights or civil liberties. The Puebla Document
declares that "democracy with all of its weaknesses is closer to
the defense of the Christian values than any other political
system;" The document also points out to the "very frequent
tendency in Latin America to have recourse to violence, which
should be the last resort." In its view, the challenge confronting
I
Latin America is that of creating a just but free society.
In reaching these conclusions in their deliberations, the
Latin American Episcopate is following in the footsteps of the
universal Church's traditional teaching in the area of society's
governance Which consistently rejects violence except in extreme
cases where the authorities violate Divine or Natural Law. This
doctrine harks back to the teachings of the schoolmen and most
especially, st. Thomas Aquinas.
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The conclusions of the Puebla conference were very specific in
respect to the issue of violence. The final documents deplore and
condemn the use of political violence by the established
authorities and by terrorists and guerrillas. Political crimes
always vilify those who commit them, independently of reason given
to excuse them. Violence cannot be justified as a means of
liberation. Violence always engenders new forms of oppression and
slavery, usually worse than those they were supposed to remedy.
The present, Pope himself, in his inaugural speech at the,
Puebla Conference, explicitly condemned all forms of political
violence as gross violations of human rights. Regardless of their
source or origin, or of any attempted justification for its use,
violence was to be rejected.
The Second Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellin
also addressed the use of political violence in similar terms. The
proceedings quote the reaffirmation of Pope Paul VI of the basic
teachings of the Church on the subject in the encyclical Populorum
proqressio. Again, although in extreme cases of violation of the
Common Good resorting to extra legal means may be morally
justified, the Pope reminds us that armed revolution is the source
of new injustices, ruin, and social disequilibria. One cannot
eliminate one evil at the price of a larger one. Abrupt political
changes are not really effective. Social transformation has to
take place through a process of increased awareness on the part of
the people and with the direct participation of the population at
large. with this in mind, the bishops reaffirm their faith in the
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"fruitfulness of peace," quoting from Paul VI in his 1968
Allocution in Bogota that "violence is neither Christian nor
evangelical." It is also fundamentally important to realize that
the Church is adamantly insistent on its independence from any
political or social ideology. The Church is based on, and has for
its mission, the projection and dissemination of a transcendental
vision of man and his role in society. The proceedings from the
Puebla Conference reaffirm that position. They state that the
Church ~ust reject the temptation represented by certain groups
within it which want to advocate specific political policies, or
that wish to interpret the Gospels from a partial political
standpoint. In Puebla, it was said that "The Church must maintain
itself free from opposing systems in order to be able to opt for
man." "The Church does not need to have recourse to ideological
systems in order to defend and help in the liberation of man."
Finally, concerning specific or concrete views and positions
on economic reform, it can be accurately said that both Medellin
i
and Puebla, and the teachings of John Paul II, reflect quite
faithfUlly the seminal ideas contained in Mater of Magistra and
Populorum Progressio. The concrete topics around which the
problematique of socio-economic development is being discussed by
the Church in Latin America were already outlined at Medellin.
These are the excessive degree of social and economic inequality in
the societies; the marginalization .of large segments of the
popUlation from socio-economic , political, and cultural activities;
the unjust exercise of authority by those in power; the inequitable
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conditions in international trade, investment and financing; the
tax evasion and policies on profit reinvestment by multinational
corporations and other investors, and similarly related issues.
It is worth remarking, at the risk of repetition, that the
formal acceptance of the universal socio-economic implication of
certain humanistic values has gradually increased during the last
few decades, accompanied by the heightened multi-dimensional
interdependence of the world, which includes the building of a
complex international network of econpmic and financial
institutions. simultaneously with our expanded knowledge of the
social consequences deriving from the application of the secondary
principles of Natural Law to present day societies, along with our
deeper understanding of the processes of modernization and
development, there has been a rapidly growing awareness of the need
to adopt concrete domestic and international policy measures and
programs in favor of the poor.
Especially in the case of societies where the prerequisites
for development have not yet been established, it will be necessary
to bring about such transformations as required to facilitate their
creation. In line with these historical trends, the encyclicals
have gradually become more concerned with the evaluation and
criticism of means (institutions, organizations, economic
mechanisms, international system) than with the mere restatement of
general and abstract principles.
This development in the encyclicals' treatment of political,
social, and, above all, economic issues, is extremely important and .
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will have far reaching effects on the manner in which the Church
deals with the social question. In a very obvious and immediate
way, it will get the Church increasingly involved in the world.
International debates and proposals, governmental programs,
specific economic and even political policy may not fall under the
purview of Church criticism and appraisal. Undoubtedly, some will
see in this an unwelcome politicalization of Christianity. Those
criticisms have already been leveled at other Christian churches
for precisely that reason. At the other extreme, for many it will
be a welcome and long overdue relief from vapid generalities which
could be conveniently interpreted in a variety of contradictory
ways.
In the end, this will inevitably lead to a resurgence in the
age old question of God versus Caesar. Hopefully, a greatly
historically wise Christianity will not stumble on the rocks of
secularism or angelism in its dealings with an enormously complex
world in the throes of transition. Neither Henry of Sagusia or
Petrus Bertandi, nor William of Ockham or Marsilius of Padua will
now do.
The globalization of the impact and influence of Western
civilization has greatly accelerated during the Twentieth Century.
The incipient trade relations of antiquity and the early Middle
Ages, the Crusades, protracted warfare and colonialism, have ended
up in a situation characterized by economic interdependence,
political strife and technological miniaturization of the world.
Interestingly, as hinted at various points, the legacy of
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fundamental Judeo-Christian values, central to the contexture of
Western civilization, has proven to be of permanent and ever wider
appeal to peoples of all political persuasions, traditions, and
cultures. Nominal adherence to these values is now a must, even by
those that grossly violate them in practice. Unfortunately from
the viewpoint of this author, that has not been the only value
inheritance that the West has donated the world. Dignity,
equality, freedom and individualism, under the influence of
secularism, have become transmuted into economism and unbounded
economic materialism, exacerbating ever present utilitarian,
hedonistic, and generally egoistic, tendencies ever present in man
and society.
with the above in mind, let us now recapitulate those dynamic
trends and new situations which have come to characterize our
contemporary understanding of the term modernization. Through the
demonstration effect they tint human aspirations everywhere and
sharply constrain the range of solutions acceptable to modern man.
1
These are:
(1) Greater present knowledge of -the purely technical workings of
the economic system than in the recent past. Also,
(2) Better understanding of the inter-relations between the
economic subsystem and other social subsystems.
(3) As the economic sUbsystem has become increasingly secularized,
its essential logic is evermore apparent. Also, its operation
is now much less constrained or curtailed by extra-economic
. restrictions which used to interfere with the functional logic
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of the system in the past. That is, economic rationality (in
market arrangements or in planning schemes directed at
recreating market conditions and their outcome) can assert
itself much more fully under contemporary conditions of
secularization than at an historical period when the substance
of that logic and its practical outcome were considered
objectionable.
(4) The logic of economic life is, by its very nature, much more
precise, manipulable, and applicable to the real world, than
the fundamental principles governing other realms of social
activity. Nature's niggardliness, the mUltiplicity of human
wants and needs, the very limited physical energy of the human
being, the inner structure of technology and production
functions, and the necessities of the organizational world,
singly and cumulatively account for this. Thus, as economic
logic has come to suffuse social life, "intelligent" action
and policy options b~come much more restricted and empirically
ascertainable.
(5) Greater present importance accorded to the economic world as
an instrument of, and a means to, fully realize human dignity
and the essential equality of men.
(6) As science, technology, and affluence have kept on with their
relentless progress, creating a new more material society for
the great masses in developed countries, the economic world
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(independently for the purpose of this argument of
whether it is considered an end in itself or simply a
means to other consciously chosen ends) has come to
occupy a larger portion of the time and activities of man
(compare the number of working days now to those in the
Middle Ages at relative levels of productivity).
Consequently, the economic logic has come to prevail, as
means or ends, over a much wider area of human life than
was the case in past epochs.
(7) As economic relations have become more widely integrated, now
constituting a well organized world system, the application of
economic rules turns out to be greatly more feasible than in
a fragmented and compartmentalized universe, like that
existing in past epochs.
(8) Finally, economic logic is, strictu sensu, rigorously
individualistic, and economic relations are rigidly
egalitarian, in the sense that personal maximizing behavi9r is
the only operational mode yielding efficient (in the sense of
optimal aggregate benefit) and determined results for the
working of economic structures.
Given the historical progress of religious, legal, political,
social, and economic individualism as a result of the
operation of freedom as an efficient cause, and equality and
dignity as a material cause in the West, the pure logic of
economics becomes a valuable instrument for the organization
of a socially just economic life.
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This is so much so the
case, that even the counsels and injunctions of the Church in
favor of individually poor people or of poor nations in the
world do not dispense with the essential logic of markets and
exchange. Although the Church goes beyond the classical
indirect controls of the economy, it does not seek to
supersede or abolish the logic of exchange and its
institutions.
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VI. MATER ET MAGISTRA AND BALANCED GROWTH:
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
This section will attempt to briefly exemplify how the social
teachings of the Catholic Church are gradually gaining in concrete-
ness and direct applicability to the social question. Mater et
Magistra is the one encyclical that specifically refers to balanced
economic growth. The encyclical treats and elaborates the non-
economic consequences or effects following from the application of
that approach to economic development. Balanced growth is seen to
be compatible with or, better, conducive to the Christian goals in
social life. The doctrine of balanced growth is thus set in the
total context of social organization and institutions. It is
organically interrelated to a particular or specific social pattern
whose characteristics would partly emerge from the application of
the balanced growth method itself to the economic sphere. Rerum
Novarum and Quadragfesimo Anno, the other two preceding encyclicals
with major economic content, serve to acquaint us more fully with
the nature of the social traits and goals that follow from
adherence to the principles of Natural Law, whose promotion is
fostered by the application of balanced growth to development.
Although the concern of the encyclical is not with economic
analysis as such, nonetheless important phenomena related to the
latter are indirectly clarified in the process of investigating the
relationship of balanced growth to social forms and processes.
That, of course, was to be expected.
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After all, economic
development as a social phenomenon can be identified with economic
variables only in terms of the most immediate functional relations
of these. Some of the insights thus gained in the study of the
encyclicals prove to be valuable in the theoretical field where
debate between balanced growth and its opposite has moved. In the
process, a better appreciation emerges of the nature and strength
of the relations existing between a certain pattern of development
and such other elements as geographic dispersion of investment,
income distribution, gradualness of development strategy, private
actions versus pUblic planning and compatibility with democratic
institutions.
Concerning the preceding questions which embody the crux of
our analysis, the contribution that the encyclical makes to their
clarification can be classified as follows:
(1) The encyclical states some evident connections between
balanced growth as a cause and certain outcomes, both of an
economic and a non-economic nature, which are regarded as
constituting desirable goals in themselves.
(2) The encyclical states some other relations between balanced
growth as a cause and other outcomes, e.g. democratic insti-
tutions, which are not immediately evident.
With the above in mind, we may now interject the notion of
balanced growth in the wider context of a dynamic socio-economic
and political milieu. In such an ambience, the purely economic
concept acquires a new teleological dimension. It is no longer one
more growth strategy, but an instrument for the realization of
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fundamental man-desired goa.ls. It truly becomes, in this new
framework, one more thread in the singular pattern that
characterizes the often submerged ancient mainstream of Christian
political economy. In that context, balanced growth is one of the
requirements of the Common Good. Balanced growth becomes an
instrument for: (a) sustained and smooth (efficient or
continuous), as well as exponentially predictable (the result of
the gradual and foreseeable building up of sectoral relations and,
thus, of the full-emploYment rate of growth) economic development;
(b) Development based on a not-excessive rate of non-consumption,
as ensured by the very efficiency and gradualness of the process.
In order for the growth process to be efficient or continuous on
the one hand, and gradual (inter-connected) on the other, the whole
development process must be geared to and oriented by, at least
primarily, market indicators. This condition will serve to provide
limits to the level of present sacrifices; (c) Wider sectoral
dispersion of income than that under patterns
!
of investment
characterized by a high sectoral concentration; (d) Wider
geographic dispersion of income than under concentrated
(locationally speaking) sectoral investment.
In relation to income distribution, the following questions
have to be considered. An unbalanced growth strategy will tend to
have a higher concentration of capital intensive industries per
unit of investment than a gradual investment approach would show.
Also, (a) capital intensive industries may show a higher rate of
profits than labor intensive ones; and (b) wage rates may be higher
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than in more labor intensive industries, but there will be less
employment per unit of investment. In addition, like in the case
of high profits, the marginal propensity to import of the income
recipients will be high, and the mUltiplier-accelerator mechanism
with whatever effect it could have on growth through induced
investment, will be also smaller. However, savings may be higher,
and so would be reinvestment as indicated by the Galenson-
Liebenstein Investment criterion. With a remote pat~ern of
investment (concentrated on the Austrian description of the higher
stages of the production matrix) the actual dispersion of income
distribution will depend on whether the remote pattern itself is
(a) relatively concentrated or (b) dispersed. A dispersed remote
pattern, it is true, could distribute income among as many sectors
as a more proximate, market-oriented pattern. But even in that
case, the remote pattern would not distribute income among so many
people as the proximate model would.
Finally, it should be realized that a balanced strategy is
1
associated with rapidity or fastness of growth. Balanced growth
with limited resources (that is, excluding diverse versions of an
all encompassing, unlimitedly endowed Big Push) must be, by
definition, gradual. The more modest the quantum of available
resources is, relative to what is anticipated as the final or
terminal position of full development, the more gradual the process
must be. Gradualness results from the parallel, coextensive and
simultaneous growth of inter-related sectors ~ The limits to
gradualness are fixed by the amount of available, investable
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resources existing at a moment in time, by the stage of development
(input/output relations already built), by the volume of the
foreign supply of goods and services, and by the pattern of
intermediate and final demands for goods and services.
Balance makes for rapid growth through its continuity. The
implementation of this pattern implies and requires the
simultaneity of parallel and symmetrical growth or extension of
prod~ctive relations among closely related sectors. The
ambitiousness of the effort or, what is the same, the determination
of what constitutes closeness in a particular situation is, of
course, variable. The overall rule, though, calls for the building
of inter-connected development blocks in an uninterrupted fashion
in the balanced approach. Gradualness is not tantamount to
slowness, but efficiency. The efficiency of gradualness, reflected
in the weaving of connected threads is more rapid than the
dispersion of effort typical of more spectacular approaches.
Populorum Progressio contains some very modern teachings on
development and international relations. After decrying those
colonial policies which have fostered monoculture and, thus,
instability in the economies of colonized lands, it goes on to
state the serious obligation of advanced nations to help the
developing ones. Rich countries have the duty to help poor ones.
The former should not keep all of their wealth to themselves. They
should contribute to the development of the latter. In this
context, there is a need to create a world fund to disburse
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financial and technical international aid, making grants and soft
loans available to those nations needing them.
After reiterating that the principles held by Rerum Novarum
remain valid, the encyclical goes on to say, in reference to trade
relations between developed and underdeveloped countries that, if
the power of the contracting parties is too unequal, the consent of
the parties themselves is not sufficient to assure the justice of
the contract. There is thus a need to rectify inequitable trade
relations. The document then proceeds to assert that the exchange
economy cannot be exclusively founded on free competition. The
same rules that apply to the determination of the just wage are
also valid in the area of international contracts. It concludes
that free trade is equitable only if sUbjected to the requirements
of social justice, and that prices reSUlting from the operation of
competitive markets can actually be unfair.
Populorum Progressio is extremely specific in its teachings on
international economic relations. It calls attention to the sharp
and unexpected· fluctuations in the prices of the primary
commodities exported by the less developed countries, and the
progressively increasing price of their imports of manufactured
goods from developed countries. As a result of this, the poor
remain in that condition, while the rich grow still richer.
Clearly, the encyclical comes down in favor of the thesis of
the secular deterioration of the terms of trade relation for
underdeveloped countries. It espouses an analytic approach to the
question reminiscent of that of R. Prebisch. Translated into
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economic language, it seems to attribute oligopolistic powers to
developed countries in the conduct of their export trade and
oligopsonistic ones in their purchase of imports from less
developed nations. Populorum Progressio maintains that a certain
equality of opportunity has to be established in the relations
between developed and less developed countries. To that effect, it
recommends the adoption of schemes for price stabilization of
internationally trade~ goods, cqmmodity agreements, and other such
measures as will serve to create a more balanced exchange between
the two groups of countries.
In closing, the encyclical letter asks for greater
collaboration and organization among the less developed countries
in order to promote their common advantage. It would also be
beneficial for them to coordinate their investment and organize
their trade. Moreover, regional agreements among these nations and
wider cooperation for their mutual economic' support, are to be
taken as signs of progress on the road to development. Finally,
the document emphasizes the important role to be played by
international institutions in helping to establish an order of
justice among nations such as the one it describes.
As indicated at the beginning of this section, Mater et
Magistra and Populorum Progressio have been selected as prime
examples to illustrate the tendency towards particularization and
policy specificity, along with the clear intention to make use of
economic analysis and social science propositions, which
characterizes contemporary Christian social teaching. section V
54
amplifies on this topic, both by making reference to empirical
evidence in other social documents, as well as by means of a
theoretical recapitUlation of the trends and forces accounting for
this development.
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VII. THE COMMON GOOD: THE ROLES OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION
Cooperation and competition can coexist, but at different
levels of social organization. Different economic institutions and
arrangements have to individually reflect or be based upon either
a competitive or a cooperative basis. Both forces must be utilized
in social organization. Harmony and reconciliation between them
takes place within the total social structure. It is this
structure which must be functional, well-coordinated and congruous.
The overall rationality, harmony, and coordination of the structure
does not derive from the singleness or identity of its components.
But from the skillful, wise, and natural (in accordance with the
necessities of human nature and principles of social organization)
blend between opposed but equally primeval, and thus, useful and
powerful forces. That is why the true overall and highest good of
the community, the Common Good, will not derive from arrangements
or associations that do not provide room for the working of these
forces. The suppression of competition, for example, in the name
of a wrongly understood, artificial solidarity enforced by the
adoption of certain social forms, will not eliminate the basic
motives and drives behind it without, on the other hand, being able
to preserve efficiency. At the other extreme, the suppression of
explicitly recognized and institutionally incorporated solidary
values makes for the fragility of the social structure as reflected
in the alienation of great numbers who feel no commitment, if not
outright antipathy, towards their society. This is most especially
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aggravated in situations of economic backwardness, when relative
differences in income are contemplated from below at levels
sometimes precariously verging on purely physical subsistence.
In accordance with the above it should be clear that
occupational groups, oftentimes popularly conceived in Catholic
social literature as comprising antagonistic economic interests,
should not be viewed as the basic decision making agents in the
economy. These associations have a function to discharge in
helping to elaborate the overall general economic guidelines of
society, as well as in providing and preserving the solidary
characteristics of the social system (which in turn mark the
outward limit or boundaries of desirable competitive behavior).
But as regards economic conduct in the vast area within, the
individual first and foremost, and his representative organizations
only in a collaborative and subservient function to him, should be
entrusted with the vital function of maintaining competitive
behavior. The individual must remain, at all moments, the
identifiable economic agent in whose behalf and through whose
actions economic production, consumption, and distribution take
place.
To substitute some collectivity for the individual as the
basic unit of economic action and evaluation, would resemble the
utilization of hypothetical constructs endowed with a reified life
.and teleology of their own, as is the case in German idealistic
philosophy; or else, is akin to the gross analogies between
anatomy and physiology on the one hand, and organismic theories of
57
society, on the other. The first leads to conclusions that, by
nature of the case, will always be incompatible with the test of
reasonableness. They are logical, but not rational. In that sense
they are not operational (or less so than those philosophical
systems based on some form of sensualism). The latter are crudely
animistic, tending to ascribe to the purely formal structures of
the social kingdom the nontransferable characteristics of life in
biologically organized beings.
It is a tribute to the realism of the mainstream of scholastic
philosophy and the Lockeian tradition that their view of the
individual and society was such, that it has constituted a solid
substratum for the modern development of the social sciences along
scientific lines and with a powerful leaning towards the empirical.
The preceding does not preclude, of course, a realistic study
of social collectivities and relations. If this were to be the
case, economics would be, which it is not, a rather stereotyped and
formalized conglomerate of axioms applicable to Robinson Crusoe-
like situations and nothing else. It is always possible to
formulate perfectly rational and consistent bodies of policies once
reasonable neo-classical assumptions--a la Marshall or Edgeworth--
about interpersonal comparisons of utility and partial welfare
functions, their mutual relationship and order of preference, are
determined. Christian social thought has never recoiled at this
prospect and is certainly up to that task. The entire Common Good
tradition or the more specific body of Peschian economics would
serve as a case in point. However, to plunge into the currents of
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economic and welfare relations between collectives solely garbed in
the armor of economic theory (say in the manner of Kenneth Arrow
and his impossibility theorem) is to surely sink to the bottom. To
swim in those waters we need a clearly formulated list of
axiological priorities, preferences, and interactions. Only then,
with economics acting in a purely technical role, can we hope to
attain meaningful and efficient social solutions.
The concept of the Common Good, Public Good, or Public
utility, or as expressed nowadays Social Welfare, was aimed by the
schoolmen at facilitating the satisfaction of the socio-economic
needs and wants of the members of society to the greatest possible
extent, given the circumstances and limitations of each particular
historical situation. consequently, it was directed at the
attainment of the greatest aggregate satisfaction possible in the
given historical contexts of time and place. Their analytical and
'normative propositions, then, were directed towards what was just
and convenient in the institutionalization and regularization of
economic life. For it was necessary to reconcile the differences
. and antagonisms that would emerge if each individual were to try to
attain a maximum of satisfaction for himself in an unconstrained
environment, thus, in effect, disregarding the legitimate needs and
satisfactions of others.
Clearly, the greatest happiness of one man may result in the
profound unhappiness of ano.ther. That. is why the motto of Bentham,
"The greatest happiness of the greatest number," must be severely
qualified, so that the happiness of the collectivity may not
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eventuate in the greatest happiness of the majority at the expense
of a minimum of happiness for the rest.
In passing, two important issues instrumentally but closely
related to the attainment of the Common Good should be mentioned.
First, what kind of an economic organization would be required to
produce the desired results? It has been amply proven that the
instantaneous position of maximum satisfaction in production would
result from the markets· attaining long run equilibrium under
perfect competition, plus whatever other adjustments the optimal
would require relating to increasing and decreasing social and
private costs, as well as other kinds of social externalities.
Dynamic efficiency would necessitate, of course, taking into
account such other variables as the level of R&D, productive
investment and entrepreneurial activity in society. All the more
reason, one might add, to make certain that the spirit and
incentives to private enterprise and activity are given ample
opportunity to bloom in a receptive milieu.
On the side of distribution, we would have to keep in mind
other concepts relating to redistribution as demanded by social
justice and the Common Good. In this regard, not only an
evaluation of the individual's total socio-economic contribution to
society (in contrast to purely economic imputations at the margin)
would have to be taken into consideration, but also, and most
importantlY, the minimal requirements for the development of his
human potential would have to be made available. Secondly, if we
are guided by the preceding principles in the conduct of everyday
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affairs, it is a logical consequence that our actions, as measured
by the standards of individual and social needs and wants and their
satisfaction, must be effective and appropriate. Up to a certain
point this is merely the statement of a triviality. What is not,
is that our actions will in that case be also just. An action is
just if it complies with the Natural Law, either as a set of rules
directly imposed by nature upon us, or as norms that conform with
objective social necessity at a given time, as seen under the
guidance of ratio recta. What is necessary is rational (according
to nature's order) and normal. What effectively satisfies this
necessity is just. Then a just norm or disposition is that one
which is adjusted to the social necessity from a utilitarian Common
Good approach as viewed in the light of reason, ratio recta, under
the dictates of the Natural Law.
Thus, we conclude that the Common Good is not only, nor even
frequently, the resultant of the maximum 'satisfaction of many or
the greatest number in society; nor society's or the state's good
as separate and different from the individuals' good, but the
maximum possible satisfaction for all, given the rights of each
person and a minimum, imprescriptible level of satisfaction of the
human needs of every person. In the attainment of the Common Good,
members' agreements and differences, aspirations and needs, duties
and rights, must, of course, be taken into consideration.
In helping us to concertize the Common Good, economics
provides us with the knowledge of possible alternatives of conduct
in a given situation and with criteria of efficiency and adequacy
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as regards the logical and intelligent character of relations
between ways and ends, means and goals. Nonetheless, economics
will not provide us with unambiguous principles and so~ial values,
pUblic goals and objectives, much less· with moral criteria for
jUdging the good and the bad. However, the Natural Law as a set of
optimal rules modelling the ideal configuration of social
institutions and inter-personal behavior, meant by nature, or
bette~ its Creator, to guide our lives not only in the physical,
but also in the moral and intellectual world, provides us with
those essential criteria for jUdgment and action. It offers us the
only available avenue for true and integral consistency among the
multifaceted and intricate requirements, desires and constraints,
posed by human aspirations interacting in an enormously complex
social world and in a relatively small and limited physical
habitat. The natural order of things ~ust be necessarily followed
in order for society to function and evolve normally. That is why
economics and the economic order must be organized along "normal,"
"natural," "just," "convenient," and "reasonable," lines. All of
these conditions ideally converge and are subsumed in the concept
of the Good Society. Now, the Christian society ordered according
to Natural Law, would constitute the embodiment of the Good Society
we wish to bring about.
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VII. COMPETITION AND COOPERATION AS ORGANIZING AGENTS
OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE
I doubt that the simple inter-relationship of the market with
other non-economic institutions will be sufficient to make a good
society, as K. Boulding seems to maintain in his works. The very
difficult question consists in the fact that we want to preserve
the working of the market because of the nature of the functions it
performs (efficiency in resource allocation, free exchanges, etc.),
and at the same time we want a set of motivations of a non-economic
character on the part of the people who make it work. Now, how can
we introduce these motivations without altering the beneficial
results of markets and also create an attitude of social
responsibility we deem desirable? The query could be also posed as
follows: How far do strictly economic motivations go in
determining the economic results of competitive markets? Most of
us would probably agree that they determine them to a large degree.
On the other hand, if we saw non-economic motivations, e.g.
responsibility and mutual concern, as a check on undesirable
outcomes brought about by the unrestricted and unalloyed operation
of economic forces (similar, perhaps, to those results that derive
from non-competitive markets), then it could be claimed that the
object of exercising a dose of social responsibility is the
attainment of goals of a competitive-like character in the market.
It would seem that, in practical terms, the only way to avoid the
paralysis in action that would result from trying to simUltaneously
follow the conflicting motivations informing the market place on
the one hand, and those which at least in the past were
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traditionally inculcated by church, school, and home, on the other,
at the same time that we seek to preserve the desirable results
flowing from the kind of behavior informing competition, is for
these two sets of motivations to intertwine or interlace in a
vertical rather than in a horizontal fashion. That is, for them to
operate at different levels of social organization and action.
Although superficially this could be open to the charge long ago
made by F. Briefs concerning the application of dual ethics at
business and at home, such a criticism would essentially miss the
point. The reason for this resides in the fact that in the model
of economic liberalism the two ethics apply in two unrelated social
realms: namely, the economic system and family organizations. In
our case, both the motivation for self-advancement (gain, profit,
benefit) leading to competition, and the sense of responsibility
and communality that actuates the desire for social cooperation,
would be vitaily present in the sphere of public social life
through their embodiment in various socio-economic organizational
forms. For example, the producing units (firms) and sellers of the
services of productive factors would behave competitively , and
thus, be guided by the appropriate motivations; so also would
behave, as natural extensions of the latter, the trade unions and
trade or employers associations, which are group-individualistic
structures. On the other hand, vocational groups and other
voluntary associations would be animated, primarily, by
considerations related to the good of their particular profession,
kind of activity, industry, or sector (their prosperity, stability,
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opportunities for human growth, modernization, and productivity),
and by the requirements of the Common Good in the relationships of
an activity, profession, industry, or sector with others and with
the socio-economic system in its totality. Although competition
need not be based on egoistic motivations, much less constitute an
anti-social and self-centered act, it certainly is a necessary
social function for the maintenance of productivity and efficiency
and for a non-exploitative sharing of the product in a market
economy. The competitive tension and exertion in production is
necessary to ensure lowest prices, highest quality and the adoption
of technical progress. This, clearly, refers to a realistic type
of Marshallian competition, not to the textbook model of a static
and disembodied purely competitive system. In distribution it is
necessary to actualize, even if as a first approximation to social
reality, a-pattern in conformity with the relative productivity of
the factors as flowing from their contribution to production as
this is evaluated by society, and not as it would result from a
monopolistic and monopsonistic appropriation of the product by a
central planning body or other non-market devices.
It should also be noticed, in relation to the fundamental
problem of the differences inherent in reconciling the two
antagonistic sets of motivations represented by competition and
cooperation, that such an antagonism could be mitigated although
not made to disappear altogether. The amelioration could be
carried out by making the individual conscious in his education and
social formation that his competitive behavior is, to the extent
65
that it is carried out in a reasonably "perfect" market and
sUbjected to the regulations and limitations that the Common Good
imposes on it, which is decidedly socially beneficial. After all,
one should keep in mind that practically all of the criticisms and
invectives against the market are really directed at its
imperfections and not at the workings of the ideal pure model,
which is theoretically accepted even in the academic blueprints of
rationally planned socialist societies. (The so-called model of
market socialism). In reality, the universal harmony notion of A.
Smith, gyg economist, his harmonia preestabilita, was only naive
and pedestrian to the extent that he, and others along the same
lines, thought that self-interest, no matter how refined or
enlightened, would be a sufficient condition for social harmony and
order to obtain. Self-interest by itself cannot produce the best
of worlds, neither will results and effects flowing from actions
inspired' by self-interest be, or were ever likely to be,
voluntarily sanctioned and accepted by all.
The Common Good may require sacrifices from individuals and
groups that would not be elicited from them unless there were to be
a loyalty to trans-individual values. No matter the degree of his
egotistic enlightenment, an individual which is guided exclusively
by such motivations will not yield to the Common Good (unless
coerced) if he does not distinguish an immediate or future benefit
that will fUlly compensate for his sacrifices in a manner
acceptable to him. Interestingly, an egoist would have to possess
a vastly subtle and understanding mind to sacrifice as much as a
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simpler mind guided by values transcending his narrow personal
interests. In any case, the bulk of the population would never
sacrifice out of subtle considerations.
The sacrifices required by the Common Good may become
increasingly difficult as they touch upon diverse socio-economic
issues. starting by what may be particular restrictions on wages,
prices, and profits in a certain industry, to regulations of
investment policies and also of domestic output and imports with a
view to attain wider and more important national goals; to the
acceptance of the fact that under dynamic and unstable conditions
the market distribution may not comply with the Common Good and
distributive justice; to cooperation with structural reforms that
will perfect the market, making it more competitive through power-
equalization and more cohesive through better knowledge, the
implementation of the Common Good requires the good will and
"disinterested cooperation of all:
with the limitations already expressed it remains true,
nevertheless, that self-interest, especially when seen in the light
of its expression and realization in the traditional scholastic
context of society's service, remains a powerful force for
betterment and for the attainment of socio-economic harmony. Once
self-interest is seen and interpreted in an appropriate social
framework, it will not be that difficult to adopt the cooperative
attitudes and the Common Good-oriented viewpoint that would be
required of those whose functions are to constitute vocational and
other voluntary groups. That is, the transition from one set of
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motivations to the other would not be marked by the necessity for
radical reversions of attitudes, or for the need to bridge wide
chasms in orientation, thus making it almost impossible for the
same men to rationally and honestly perform both sets of functions
and share both kinds of attitudes. A concluding word should be
devoted to the problem of natural harmony in the light of the
previous comments. It should be obvious at this point that harmony
is neither objectively and necessarily present in the economic or
social order by the pre-determined or pre-established play of
natural and unswerving forces; neither does it derive exclusively
from man's intellectual resolution and determined will to see
harmony and order prevail. To the extent that the latter
crystallizes it is due to the convergence of both objective and
sUbjective rationalism, to use Schumpeter's terminology.
In the economic field maximization of production and
consumption values are logically established by the organizational
and behavioral conditions of the pure competition theorem, which is
logically correct and enormously useful as a referential schema for
society. Undoubtedly, it has proven its worth in helping us to
organize our institutions and pattern our behavior along acceptably
approximate lines conducive to satisfying the universally expressed
goals of maximum satisfaction of needs in a limited and scarce
environment. In the social field the attainment of harmony and
order is a more difficult endeavor. In the first place, the
physically tangible restrictions are not as obvious as in the
economic field. In the second place, and related to the first
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point, we have to deal with very complex and multifaceted realities
which are not reducible to logical models or are primarily
connected by means of a few, clear-cut alternative organizational
and institutional forms. Thirdly, as a logical deduction from the
preceding, it follows that the more encompassing the fields of
relations under consideration, and the more knowledge which is thus
required of entities like man and society, the more necessary it
becomes to weave and connect optimal forms of agglomeration and
conduct at several different qualitative levels of life. We might
say then, by way of conclusion, that the more we travel away from
the immediate relations posed by a scanty nature and ambitious man,
the more necessary it becomes to appeal to SUbjective rationalism,
to deposit faith in the power of reason to discern and apprehend
the ultimate realities of man and his world.
Under contemporary conditions man must assume much larger
responsibility than in the past for the organization of his social
environment. He must also grow more aware of the necessity to
foster the right kind of competitive-cooperative mix in order to
build a world both efficient and equitable, abundant and also
harmonious. It would seem, as stated in the Summary and
Conclusions to this work, that the hope for creating such a kind of
society must be based on fostering a truly prismatic market
situation characterized by a wide variety of organizational and
structural forms. In turn, this morphological pluralism must be
combined with the appropriate and varying blends of competitive-
cooperative motivations, attitudes and behavior, which are to be
69
applied at different levelS of the socio-economic structure. The
overall principle being, of course, that the cooperative component
must increase in importance as we pass from the individual to the
collective or from the particular to the general. That is, as we
come to deal with those issues which constitute the prerequisites
for the actualization of the Common Good itself. If these two
conditions were to appear to be too stringent for mankind to adopt,
let us pause and reflect on the fact that they constitute a minimum
minimorum in terms of required personal SYmpathy and good will on
the part of the social agents. If these modest requirements cannot
be met, there is no hope of more complex and demanding schemes and
wide-ranging social reforms being adopted by society.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, our definition of social economy must stem from a
view of essential human nature. The harmonious and reciprocally
beneficial relationship between the basic traits constituting human
nature and the institutional and functional patterns of society
lies at the foundation of any conception of social economy.
Naturally, consistency among these elements, although a most
important necessary condition of social economy, does not by itself
ensure an efficient solution. Cultural congruity and flexibility
to accommodate dissent are also significant factors in the search
for optimality.
Natural Law thinking by the scholastics adumbrated from the
Thirteenth Century onwards the concept of a market economy
organized along the lines of competitive pricing. Influences
hailing from the enlightenment in the continent and philosophical
empiricism and utilitarianism in England, helped to shape
alternative collectivist notions appropriate to a socialist
society. In the former, the Common Good concept succeeds in
establishing the desired correspondence between individual rights
and social obligations, but only at the cost of assuming extremely
stringent and clearly unreal conditions of market perfection and,
in all probability also, at least mildly cooperative motivations
and sUbstantive compliance on the part of social agents.
In the absence of these, it would be hardly possible to solve
difficulties like those posed by the determination of the scope of
state activities and the concomitant questions raised by
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distributive and contributive justice. In the latter, the concept
of the commonweal overwhelms the individuality of the human person.
The group has precedence over the individual in a large number of
activities and areas. The subordination of personal ends to
collective objectives reduces the sphere of freedom to an
unacceptable extent. The antipodal laissez-faire social model
creates a mirror situation in which the Common Good cannot be
actualized. The ensuing social ambience would negate the very
validity of the concept.
The foregoing observations could lead one to think that some
of the many variants of contemporary liberalism would represent an
ideal compromise. This' would be totally unjustified. The
mechanical juxtaposition of the market and the public sector is not
really a satisfactory solution to the problems of modern society.
The tensions generated by the opposite principles governing these
realms are opening a growing chasm which will be increasingly
difficult to negotiate by syncretic ideologies. A new approach
which would integrate them would constitute the true hallmark of a
modern system of social economy.
However, no organic sYmbiosis is possible. The primary reason
being curiously enough, of a mechanical or processual nature.
There is an inherent contradiction between the methods used for the
expression of personal preferences and their objective value
determination in society and those which must be applied in order
to externalize collective preferences and their objectified social
value. No general theory of economic value which would reconcile
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these antipodal principles involved in the private-public or
individual-collective dichotomy is logically possible.
This leaves but one avenue only to an institutional attempt at
reform. It would consist in the creation of a pluralistic market
of socio-structural and behavioral options. The provision of
alternative modes of association in accordance with the demand
schedules resulting from the frequency distribution of voluntary
choices in a given population has a number of decided advantages.
Not only would it lead, ceteris paribus, to a maximum of aggregate
satisfaction, but it would also preserve the much valued efficiency
traits of a market system, while it would simultaneously allow for
a considerable degree of privatization of the multitude of variable
factors contained in the concept of the Common Good. By the same
token, market responsive plural options would minimize the need for
agreement among the members of the body politic. The social
contract or the volonte generale would be SUbjected to a minimum of
inner conflicting centrifugal forces. Some general consensus would
still be necessary as to the more abstract and long term contents
of the Common Good in several areas of social life, but many other
thorny issues would also disappear at one fell swoop.
Interestingly, the latter are oftentimes those in which mutual
consent is most difficult. The proximity of instrumental values
and social means magnify our readiness to clash over them, while
the remoteness and unspecificness of higher values, tend to
decrease our contentiousness. Lastly, a socially sponsored system
of market oriented organizational options can be affixed a price
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tag and the formula can be implemented on a piecemeal basis in
tandem with degree of social willingness and resource availability.
Only so can the Gordian knot be cut.
74
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Andreski, Stanislav, ed. Max Weber on Capitalism. Bureaucracy,
and Religion, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983.
Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choices and Individual Values, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.
Arrow, Kenneth J. The Limits of Organization, W. W. Norton &
Company, 1974.
Aspen Interreligious Consultation. Global Justice and
Development, Washington: OVerseas Development Council, 1975.
Biblioteca de Autores cristianos. vaticano II. Documentos,
Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores cristianos, 1979.
Bloch, Marc. Feudal Society, 2 vols. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1974.
Bockle, Franz, ed. The Social Message of the Gospels, New York:
Paulist Press, 1968.
Boulding, Kenneth. The Organizational Revolution, New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1953.
Boulding, Kenneth. The Meaning of the 20th Century, New York:
Harper & Row, 1964.
Boulding, Kenneth. The Economv of Love and Fear, Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973.
Boulding, Kenneth. Human Betterment, Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1985.
Boulding, Kenneth. Beyond Economics. Essays on Society. Religion
and Ethics, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1968.
Brandt, Richard B., ed. Social Justice, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.
Braudel, Fernand. Afterthouahts on Material civilization and
Capitalism, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,
1977.
Braudel, Fernand. Capitalism and Material Life. 1400-1800,
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers 1973.
Burke, Peter, ed. Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe,
New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972.
75
Carey, George and Schall, James, eds~ Essays on Christianity and
Political Philosophy. Lanham: University Press of America,
1984.
CELAM. Medellin: Conclusiones, Bogota: CELAM, 1979.
CELAM. III Conferencia General del Episcopado Latino Americano,
Puebla: CELAM, 1978.
Chadwick, Henry. The Early Church, New York: Penguin Books,
1980.
Chadwick, OWen. The Secularization of the European Mind in
the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975.
Clark, John Maurice. Economic Institutions and Human Welfare,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
Cronin, John F. Social Principles and Economic Life, Milwaukee:
The Bruce Publishing Company, 1959.
Dahl, Robert A. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982.
Dempsey, Bernard W. The Functional Economy, Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958.
Duby, Georges. The Early Growth of the European Community,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974.
Duff, Edward. The Social Thought of the World Council of
Churches, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1956.
Eisenstadt, S.N. Tradition, Change and Modernity, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1973.
Gager, John. Kingdom and Community, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1975.
Gelp, Daniel. Beyond .Individualism, Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.
Giordani, Iginio. The Social Message of the Earlv Church
Fathers, Boston: st. Paul Editions, 1977.
Glasner, Peter E. The Sociology of Secularisation, Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.
Grampp, William D. Economic Liberalism, 2 vols. New York:
Random House, Inc., 1965.
76
Gremillion, Joseph, ed. The Gospel of Peace and Justice,
Catholic Social Teachings Since Pope John, New York:
Orbis Books, 1976.
Griffith, Carol, ed. Christianity and Politics, Washington,
Ethics and ~lic Policy Center, 1981.
Gutierrez Garcia, Jose L. Doctrina Pontificia. Documentos
Politicos, Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores cristianos, 1958.
Haberler, Gottfried and Stern, Robert M., eds. Equilibrium
and Growth in the World Economy.Economic Essays by Ragnar
Nurkse, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Illich, Ivan. The Church. Change and Development. Chicago:
Urban Training Center Press, 1970.
Jorge, Antonio. Competition. Cooperation. Efficiency and Social
Organization: Introduction to a Political Economy,
cranbury: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1978.
Jorge, Antonio and SUllivan, John J. "The Impact of Alternative
Investment Strategies on the Long-Run Rate of Growth,"
The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. XIV (April-June 1967),
pp.590-603.
Juan Pablo II. Mensaje a la Iglesia de Latinoamerica, Madrid:
Biblioteca de Autores cristianos, 1979.
Kirshner, Julius. Business. Bankina. and Economic Thought in
Late Medieval and Early Modern Eruope, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Lukacs, John. The passing of the Modern Age, New York:
Harper & Row PubliShers, 1972.
MacIntyre. After virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.
Margolis, Howard. Selfishness. Altruism and Rationalitv, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Martin, David. A General Theory of Secularization, New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1978.
Meier, Gerald M. Leading Issues in Development Economics,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Messner, J. Social Ethics. Natural Law in the Modern World,
st. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949.
77
Mulcahy, Richard E. Th~>E:C;onomics··of ·Heinrich Pesch, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960.
Mulcahy, Richard E., ed. Readings in Economics, westminster:
The Newman Press, 1959.
Murchland, Bernard. The Dream of Christian socialism, Washington:
American Enterprise Institute, 1982.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960.
Nisbet, Robert. The Ouest For Community, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1969.
Novak, Michael. Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions,
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989.
Novak, Michael. The Spirit Of Democratic Capitalism, New York:
American Enterprise Institute/Simon & Schuster, 1982.
Novak, Michael,· ed. capitalism and Socialism, A Theological
Inguirv, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979.
Olson, Mancur. The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982.
Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition, Vols. 1 & 3.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 and 1978.
Pennington, Kenneth and somerville, Robert, eds.
Law« Church and Society: Essays in Honor of Stephan Kuttner «
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.
Postan, M. M. Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General
Problems of the Medieval Economy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Quade, Quentin, ed. The Pope and Revalution, Washington:
Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982.
Schall, James. The Politics of Heaven & Hell Lanham:
University Press of America, 1984.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Historv of Economic Analysis, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954.
Social Encyclicals: Rerum Novarum, Ouadragesimo Anno,
Mater et Magistra, Populorum Proqressio, Laborem Excercens.
78
Sorokin, Pitirim. The Basic Trends of our Time, New Haven:
College & University Press, 1964.
Sorokin, Pitirim. The Reconstruction of Humanity, Boston:
The Beacon Press, 1948.
Southern, R. W. The Making of the Middle Ages, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1978.
Southern, R. W. Western society and the Church in the Middle Ages,
New York: Penquin Books, 1978.
Stevenson, Leslie. Seven Theories of Human Nature, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974.
Tawney, R. H. Religion and the Rise of capitalism, Gloucester:
Peter smith, 1962.
Taylor,O. H. Economics and Liberalism. Collected Papers,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
Taylor, o. H. The Classical Liberalism. Marxism. and the
Twentieth centurY, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966.
Tonnies, Ferdinand.
New Brunswick:
Community and Society,
Transaction Books, 1988.
Troeltsch, Ernst. Protestantism and Progress, Boston:
Beacon Press, 1958.
Troeltsch, Ernst. The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches,
2 vols. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.
Weiner, MYron, ed. Modernization, New York: Basic Books, Inc.
1966.
Wilber, Charles K., ed. The Political Economy of Development
and Underdevelopment, New York: Random House, 1979.
Wilson, Thomas and Skinner, Andrew, eds. The Market and the State.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1976.
79
•

